

# Turning points in the transition to adulthood: Determinants of educational attainment, incarceration, and early childbearing among children of immigrants

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## Abstract

This article first sketches a contemporary portrait of the immigrant first and second generations of the United States, examining national-level census data to specify differences by ethnicity, gender and generation in three variables shaping socio-economic trajectories in early adulthood: educational attainment, incarceration, and childbearing. An analysis of the latest results from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study [CILS] in California is then presented, focusing on patterns and predictors of those same three variables among a sample of young adults in their mid twenties whose parents emigrated from Mexico, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and other countries of origin. As post-secondary educational attainment has become critical to social mobility for young adults, incarceration (for men) and early childbearing (for women) have emerged as turning points that can derail life course trajectories by disrupting educational and occupational opportunities to develop human capital and move into the economic mainstream, setting in motion processes of cumulating disadvantage.

**Keywords:** Immigration; education; incarceration; childbearing; early adulthood.

Fifty years ago, international migration to the United States had been so markedly reduced from its peak levels in the early twentieth century that leading scholars saw the phenomena of immigration and ethnicity as fading from American memory and decreasing in practical importance. Moreover, in the economic and baby boom that followed World War II, the timing and sequencing of traditional markers of

adulthood – leaving home, finishing school, starting work, getting married, and having children – followed a relatively predictable order. High-paying industrial jobs were plentiful, enabling most young people to become socially and economically independent by the end of their teens, and to marry and form families at young ages. In the 1950s, marriage and childbearing occurred almost in lockstep at the conclusion of schooling, and close to half of all women were married by the age of 20, many of them already pregnant on their wedding days (Settersten, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2004).

Fifty years later virtually all that had changed. A new era of mass immigration, accelerating since the 1970s and largely coming from developing countries of Latin America and Asia, transformed the ethnic composition of the population, so that by 2000, as detailed below, over 60 million persons were of foreign birth or parentage: about 22 per cent of all Americans, including 75 per cent of all ‘Hispanics’ and 90 per cent of all ‘Asians’. Their incorporation has coincided with a period of economic restructuring and rising inequality, during which the returns to education have sharply increased. As the post-World War II era of sustained economic growth, low unemployment and rising real wages ended for most workers by the early 1970s, men with only a high school degree or less were hardest hit: the proportion of those workers who failed to earn enough in a year to support a family of four at the poverty line (about \$18,500 today) grew between 1975 and 1993 from 25 to 50 per cent among Hispanics, from 31 to 45 per cent among non-Hispanic blacks, and from 14 to 24 per cent among non-Hispanic whites (Danziger 2004). Post-secondary schooling significantly lengthened for young people, with the years from 18 to the mid and even late twenties becoming increasingly devoted, often with continuing parental support, to the accumulation of human capital and college credentials. Women entered the labour market in large numbers and worked longer hours, two-income families became the norm, and the baby boom was followed by a baby bust and delayed childbearing — even as non-marital and early childbearing became defined as a social problem of national consequence (Hayes 1987; Furstenberg 2003; Wald and Martinez 2003). In short, social timetables that were widely observed half a century ago for accomplishing adult transitions have become less predictable and more prolonged, diverse and disordered.

The new era of mass immigration has also coincided with an era of mass imprisonment in the United States, which has further transformed paths to adulthood among young men with low levels of education (Pettit and Western 2004). The number of adults incarcerated in federal or state prisons or local jails in the U.S. skyrocketed during this period, doubling from over 500,000 in 1980 to 1.1 million in 1990, and doubling again to 2.1 million in 2003 (U.S. Department of

Justice 2004). Two thirds of those are in federal or state prisons, and one third in local jails; the vast majority are young men between 18 and 39. But those figures do not include the much larger number of those on probation (convicted offenders not incarcerated) or on parole (under community supervision after a period of incarceration); when they are added to the incarceration totals, over 6.9 million adults were under correctional supervision in the U.S. in 2003, or 3.2 per cent of all adults in the country. Although those official statistics are not kept by nativity or generation, they show that imprisonment rates vary widely by gender (over 90 per cent of inmates in federal and state prisons are men); by racial-ethnic groups (there were 4,834 black male prisoners per 100,000 black males in the U.S., compared to 1,778 Hispanic males per 100,000, and 681 white males per 100,000, although since 1985 Hispanics have been the fastest group being imprisoned); and by education. This is most salient among racial minorities for whom becoming a prisoner has become a modal life event in early adulthood: as Pettit and Western (2004) have noted, a black male high school dropout born in the late 1960s had a nearly 60 per cent chance of serving time in prison by the end of the 1990s, and recent birth cohorts of black men are more likely to have prison records than military records or bachelor's degrees.

During the years of the transition to adulthood from the late teens through the twenties, as post-secondary educational attainment has become critical to social mobility for both men and women, incarceration (for young men) and early childbearing (for young women) have emerged as two turning points, albeit fundamentally different ones, that can derail life course trajectories by blocking or disrupting educational and occupational opportunities to develop human capital and move into the economic mainstream. Following life course theory, by 'turning points' I refer to new situations that 'knife off' the person's past from the present and serve as catalysts for long-term behavioural change by restructuring routine activities and life course pathways, enabling identity transformations and setting in motion processes of 'cumulating advantages and disadvantages' (Elder 1974, 1998). Thus, having a prison record is not only linked to unemployment, lower wages, marital and family instability, and severe restrictions on social and voting rights (including lifetime disenfranchisement in many states), but also to stigmatized identities and pathways to criminal recidivism (Sampson and Laub 1993; Western, Kling and Weiman 2001; Western 2002; Laub and Sampson 2003). Similarly, prior research suggests that having children at an early age is more strongly and negatively associated with the educational attainments and occupational choices of women than of men (Marini 1984; Eccles 1994; Gandara 1995). In a cycle of cumulative disadvantage, young men and women with low levels of education are significantly

more likely to become a prisoner or to become a parent, respectively, than same-age and same-sex peers with higher levels of education.

What do we know in these respects about young adult children of immigrants who have been coming of age in this transformed national context, and of their patterns of intergenerational mobility? At first glance, there would appear to be considerable cause for concern. For example, despite the sizable presence of highly educated professionals among contemporary immigrant flows, who can be expected to transfer to their children their ambitions and resources, data from the 2000 Census show that the foreign-born population as a whole is more likely than the U.S.-born to be living in poverty (20.1 to 15.1 per cent), and concentrated in central cities of metropolitan areas (41.6 to 23.7 per cent); foreign-born adults are much more likely to have attained less than a high school education (37.4 to 16.6 per cent), and to be working in the bottom-rung sectors of the labour force (44.8 to 30.5 per cent). Those figures are much higher for the largest immigrant group: nearly 70 per cent of Mexican immigrants 25 and older lacked high school degrees and worked in low-wage jobs (with Duncan SEI index scores under 25).

However, the study of intergenerational mobility in the U.S. was severely undercut when the key questions on parents' country of birth – which had been asked in every decennial census from 1870 to 1970 – were dropped from the last three censuses, the principal source of national data about the American population. Data on parental nativity had permitted the clear-cut identification of the foreign-born (the first generation) from the U.S.-born of foreign parentage (second generation) and of native parentage (third and beyond generations), but since 1980 – just at the moment when such data would have been invaluable, given the extraordinarily rapid growth in the number of immigrant children and children of immigrants – that possibility was foreclosed. Instead, scholarship on the new second generation has relied on two main alternative sources: the Current Population Surveys [CPS], which after 1994 incorporated the parental nativity questions in its annual demographic survey of a nationally representative sample; and various regional and national surveys, of which the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study [CILS] is a leading example. In this article, national-level data from the 2000 Census and the CPS are used first to paint a current portrait of the first and second generations of the United States, and to examine differences by ethnicity, gender and generation in three key variables shaping socio-economic trajectories in early adulthood: educational attainment, incarceration rates (among men), and childbearing (among women). A subsequent section analyses the latest results from the CILS study in California, focusing on patterns and predictors of those same three variables, educational attainment, incarceration and early childbearing, among a sample of

young adults in their mid twenties whose parents emigrated from Mexico as well as from the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and other Asian and Latin American countries of origin, representing many of the major immigrant nationalities in the U.S. today.

### **Immigration, incarceration, and early childbearing: A national perspective**

Table 1 presents estimates of the population size and median age of the main national-origin groups composing the first and second generations of the United States, i.e., the foreign-born and the U.S.-born with at least one foreign-born parent. The data for the foreign-born first generation are drawn from the Public Use Microdata Sample (5% PUMS) of the 2000 Census; the estimates for the native-born second generation reflect adjustments to the 2000 Census population counts based on merged 1998–2002 CPS data on parental nativity (see Rumbaut 2004), which yield more accurate and reliable population estimates for U.S.-born Latin American and Asian-origin groups than are obtained with the CPS alone. As here defined, the first generation of the U.S. population numbered 34.5 million in the year 2000 (including 1.4 million island-born Puerto Ricans residing on the mainland), and the second generation added 29.2 million more (including 1.5 million mainland-born Puerto Ricans with island-born parents), producing a total of 63.7 million persons of foreign birth or parentage living in the United States—more than 22 per cent of the national population. It is worth noting that of the 34.5 million who came to the U.S. from elsewhere, 40 per cent (almost 14 million) arrived as children under 18. That population of immigrant children (broadly defined as a ‘1.5’ generation) is sometimes grouped with U.S.-born children of immigrants into a *de facto* ‘second generation’ in studies of immigrants’ offspring (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

As the data show, the Mexican-origin population clearly dwarfs all others in both the first and second generations. The first generation of Mexican immigrants totalled more than 9.3 million persons – almost 8 million more than the next sizable immigrant groups (the Filipinos, Chinese, Indians, and Vietnamese, with more than 1 million each) – indeed, larger than all other immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean combined, and of all Asia combined. With a median age of 31 years, the Mexicans were one of the youngest immigrant populations in the U.S. as well, many of them arriving in the U.S. as children under 18. The Mexican-American second generation added another 8 million persons – larger than all other second-generation groups from Latin America and the Caribbean combined, and of all Asia combined. But with a median age of only 12 years, the Mexican-

**Table 1.** *The first and second generations of the United States, 2000, by principal national origins*

National Origin	First Generation (Foreign-born)		Second Generation (US-born)		Total (1st+2nd Generations)	
	N	Median Age	N	Median Age	N	% Foreign-born
Total <sup>a</sup>	34,492,453	37	29,214,887	23	63,707,340	54
Latin America, Caribbean:						
Mexico	9,325,452	31	7,964,859	12	17,290,311	54
El Salvador, Guatemala	1,311,120	32	644,328	10	1,955,448	67
Puerto Rico <sup>b</sup>	1,437,006	41	1,515,076	21	2,952,082	49
Cuba	883,439	49	414,829	16	1,298,268	68
Dominican Republic	698,106	36	465,282	10	1,163,388	60
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru	1,107,251	37	533,298	11	1,640,549	67
Jamaica, Other West Indies	989,955	39	571,233	13	1,561,188	63
Haiti	429,848	39	219,789	11	649,637	66
Other Latin America	1,686,689	36	850,306	11	2,536,995	66
East and South Asia:						
Philippines	1,455,328	41	850,795	13	2,306,123	63
Chinese <sup>c</sup>	1,554,495	40	658,591	16	2,213,086	70
India	1,036,600	35	347,506	11	1,384,106	75
Korea	907,457	37	325,581	12	1,233,038	74
Vietnam	1,004,401	36	344,256	9	1,348,657	74
Laos, Cambodia	346,865	36	285,799	9	632,664	55
Europe and Canada:						
Canada, Great Britain	1,645,829	45	2,771,631	48	4,417,460	37
Other Europe	3,744,008	45	7,464,105	61	11,208,113	33
Elsewhere in world	4,928,604	39	2,987,624	15	7,916,228	62

**Source:** 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS; and merged Current Population Survey (CPS) annual demographic files (March), 1998 through 2002.

<sup>a</sup>Second generation estimates are calculated from CPS parental nativity data, adjusting for 2000 census population counts. Figures include all foreign-born persons (first generation) and all U.S.-born persons with at least one foreign-born parent (second generation).

<sup>b</sup>Island-born Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens by birth and not immigrants, are classified as “foreign born” for purposes of this table; mainland-born Puerto Ricans with island-born parents are classified as “second generation (U.S.-born).”

<sup>c</sup>Including Hong Kong and Taiwan.

American second generation was far younger than all second-generation British and Canadians (with a median age of 48), and all other Europeans of foreign parentage (whose median age was 61, the children of mainly Southern and Eastern European immigrants who had come to the U.S. in the early twentieth century). Both through immigration and natural increase, the Mexican-origin population of the U.S. is growing more rapidly than any other group – its 17.3 million account for 27 per cent of the total ‘foreign-stock’ population – and is as such of central interest for the study of immigrant intergenerational mobility. (Another 5 million native-born persons of native-born parents are of Mexican origin, the third and beyond generation, bringing the total population of Mexican descent in 2000 to 22.3 million.)

With the exception of the remnants of the ‘old second generation’ of Europeans and Canadians, for all other nationalities the median ages of their U.S.-born children are still very young – in fact, they mostly consist of children, with median ages ranging from 9 to 12 years for almost all the Latin American and Asian-origin groups, 13 for the Filipinos, and 16 for the Cubans and the Chinese – a telling marker of the recency of the immigration of their parents from Latin America and Asia. An important implication for studies of the ‘new second generation’ is that most of its members are still too young to be reflected in adult education, labour, and incarceration statistics, which is one reason why it remains indispensable to distinguish and incorporate the large segment of 1.5-generation immigrants who arrived as children in analyses of generational change, as is done below. On the other hand, outside of the Canadians and Europeans, and special cases such as the Puerto Ricans and the long-term Mexican presence in the Southwest, it is also the case that *for most of the Latin American and Asian nationalities listed in Table 1 there is scarcely a third generation in the U.S. as yet (let alone one with a sizable adult component); in more than 95 per cent of those cases, they comprised first- or second-generation members*, which makes the census data useful even in the absence of information on parental nativity.

### **College graduates and high school dropouts**

Table 2 uses data from the 2000 Census to focus on levels of education among 25 to 39 year olds, by gender and nativity. *The foreign-born in the table are restricted to those who arrived in the U.S. as children under 18*—that is, the broadly-defined ‘1.5 generation’ of those who became adults in the U.S.; *persons who arrived as adults are excluded from the data in the table*. The U.S.-born are persons born in the 1960s and early 1970s, that is, in the years when the new immigration from Latin America and Asia was first becoming prominent—and they are

**Table 2.** *Percent of College Graduates and High School Dropouts among 25 to 39 Year Olds, 2000: Foreign-born ( Who Arrived in U.S. as Children) vs. U.S.-born, and Males vs. Females, in Rank Order by Ethnicity*

Ethnicity (Self-reported)	Education by nativity:				Education by gender:			
	Foreign-born <sup>a</sup>		U.S.-born		Males		Females	
	College graduate	High school dropout	College graduate	High school dropout	College graduate	High school dropout	College graduate	High school dropout
Total:	23.2	31.4	27.3	11.6	25.5	14.9	28.4	11.3
Latin American Ethnicities:								
Cuban	22.9	16.9	36.7	9.1	26.0	15.4	34.1	10.3
Colombian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian	23.4	16.6	38.1	7.9	26.0	14.9	31.4	12.1
Dominican	12.4	32.6	22.1	16.8	11.9	32.2	18.3	23.8
Puerto Rican <sup>b</sup>	11.2	35.3	13.6	23.2	10.6	37.0	11.9	33.6
Mexican	4.3	61.4	13.0	24.1	8.2	43.0	11.0	33.8
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	6.4	53.1	23.8	22.5	7.0	52.8	10.0	45.9
Asian Ethnicities:								
Chinese <sup>c</sup>	58.0	9.0	72.5	3.6	60.4	8.3	66.3	5.8
Indian	59.4	6.7	72.0	5.9	64.5	6.7	61.5	6.2
Korean	59.6	3.2	69.4	3.2	61.5	3.3	61.4	3.0
Filipino	34.4	6.2	42.6	5.9	35.2	7.1	40.1	5.0
Vietnamese	41.7	13.6	†	†	39.3	14.2	43.4	13.8
Lao, Hmong, Cambodian	15.1	26.3	†	†	15.5	23.1	14.7	30.4



**Table 2** (*Continued*)

Ethnicity (Self-reported)	Education by nativity:				Education by gender:			
	Foreign-born <sup>a</sup>		U.S.-born		Males		Females	
	College graduate	High school dropout	College graduate	High school dropout	College graduate	High school dropout	College graduate	High school dropout
Other:								
White, non-Hispanic	38.8	8.7	30.7	9.1	29.6	10.5	32.2	7.7
Black, non-Hispanic	28.9	11.5	14.1	19.3	12.1	21.8	16.9	16.5

**Source:** 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS.

<sup>a</sup>Data are estimates for adults ages 25 to 39 at the 2000 census; the foreign-born are restricted to those who arrived in the U.S. as children under 18.

<sup>b</sup>Island-born Puerto Ricans are classified as “foreign born” for purposes of this table, and mainland-born Puerto Ricans as “U.S.-born.”

<sup>c</sup>Including Hong Kong and Taiwan.

<sup>†</sup>Too few cases for reliable estimates.

overwhelmingly members of the second generation (even in the case of Mexico, most of the U.S.-born Mexican Americans in Table 2 are second-generation young adults). The data are ranked in order of educational attainment by self-reported ethnicity.

First, while the proportions of college graduates are about the same overall between the foreign-born and U.S.-born, the proportion of the foreign-born with less than a high school diploma (31.4 per cent) is three times the proportion of the U.S.-born (11.6 per cent). Indeed, a notable pattern of relative upward mobility is that for all Latin American and Asian ethnicities without exception, the proportion of college graduates increases, and the proportion of high school dropouts decreases, from the foreign-born to the U.S.-born generations. However, there are very wide differences between groups from Latin America and those from Asia. The most highly educated groups by far are the Chinese, Indians and Koreans: among these young adults, nearly 60 per cent of the foreign-born and over 70 per cent of the U.S.-born have 4-year college degrees, while high-school dropout rates are in the single digits. The Filipinos and Vietnamese, Cubans and South Americans (Colombians, Peruvians, Ecuadorians) follow, with figures among the U.S.-born which match those for non-Hispanic white natives. Near the bottom of the hierarchy are found the Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, Laotians and Cambodians, with dropout rates higher than college graduation rates. By far the least educated are the Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan foreign-born, the majority of whom did not complete high school (many may have come in their teens without documents), while only 1 in 20 had completed a college degree; but among the U.S.-born, those gaps narrow considerably for those groups.

Unfortunately, among the U.S.-born, Jamaicans and Haitians, Iranians and Egyptians, Canadians and all Europeans are lumped under 'black' or 'white' in these data because for those groups, the 'race' question of the census does not permit self-identification by national origin (as it does for Asian groups), nor does the 'Hispanic' question (which allows for the identification of specific Latin American national origins). Among non-Hispanic white groups, the foreign-born are more likely than the U.S.-born to have college degrees by about 8 percentage points; but among non-Hispanic blacks, the foreign-born are far more likely to have college degrees (28.9 per cent) than to have dropped out of high school (11.5 per cent), whereas among native-born blacks the proportion of high school dropouts (19.4 per cent) exceed that of college graduates (14.1 per cent). These ethnic differences in educational attainment generally hold by gender, but females outperform males for every ethnic group almost without exception.

*Incarceration and young men*

Inasmuch as conventional theories of crime and incarceration predict higher rates for young adult males from ethnic minority groups with lower educational attainment — characteristics which describe a much greater proportion of the foreign-born population than of the native-born, as seen in Table 2 — it follows that immigrants would be expected to have higher incarceration rates than natives. And immigrant Mexican men, who comprise fully a third of all immigrant men between 18 and 39, would be expected to have the highest rates. That hypothesis is examined empirically in Table 3, but the results turn those expectations on their head. Here again, data from the 5% PUMS of the 2000 Census is used to measure the institutionalization rates of immigrants and natives, focusing on males 18 to 39, among whom the vast majority of the institutionalized are in correctional facilities (Butcher and Piehl 1997; Rumbaut 1997); and again, *the foreign-born in the table are restricted to those who arrived in the U.S. as children under 18*. (Were the foreign-born who arrived at 18 or older included in these data, the differentials between natives and immigrants shown below would be even wider.)

As Table 3 shows, the 2000 Census counted 40.8 million males age 18–39 who were either native-born or immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as children. Of them, 3.3 per cent were in federal or state prisons or local jails (a total of over 1.3 million, coinciding with official prison statistics). However, *the incarceration rate of the U.S.-born (3.5 per cent) was triple the rate of the foreign-born who arrived as children (1.25 per cent)*. (The incarceration rate for *all* foreign-born men 18 to 39, including the 4.4 million who arrived at 18 or older, was even lower: 0.86 per cent.) The 1.25 per cent rate for immigrants who arrived as children was below the 1.71 per cent rate for non-Hispanic white natives, and nine times less than the 11.6 per cent incarceration rate for native black men. The advantage for immigrants vis-à-vis natives is observed for every ethnic group, with the sole exception of Puerto Ricans, who are not immigrants since they have birthright citizenship, for whom the rates between the island-born and the mainland-born are almost identical. All the Asian immigrant groups have lower incarceration rates than the Latin American groups, with the sole exception of the foreign-born Laotians and Cambodians, whose rate of 1.12 per cent is still well below that for non-Hispanic white natives. The lowest incarceration rates among Latin American immigrants who arrived as children under 18 are seen for the least educated groups: the Salvadorans and Guatemalans (0.75 per cent), and the Mexicans (0.95 per cent). However, *those rates increase significantly for their U.S.-born co-ethnics*. That is most notable for the Mexicans, whose incarceration rate increases to 5.8 per cent among the U.S.-born; for the Vietnamese,

**Table 3.** *Percent of Males 18 to 39 Years Old Incarcerated in the United States, 2000, by Nativity and Education: Foreign-born (Who Arrived in U.S. as Children) vs. U.S.-born, in Rank Order by Ethnicity*

Ethnicity (self-reported)			Incarcerated by nativity:		Percent incarcerated, by nativity and education:			
					If Foreign-born <sup>a</sup>		If U.S.-born	
	Total males, ages 18–39 <sup>a</sup>	Total incarcerated	Foreign- born <sup>a</sup>	U.S.- born	High School Graduate?	High School Graduate?	High School Graduate?	High School Graduate?
	N	%	%	%	No	Yes	No	Yes
Total:	40,752,932	3.30	1.25	3.50	1.90	0.84	9.75	2.23
Latin American Ethnicities:								
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	193,498	1.06	0.75	3.04	0.85	0.61	4.82	2.16
Colombian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian	139,769	1.50	1.04	2.37	2.64	0.54	7.01	1.58
Dominican	107,280	3.17	2.87	3.72	4.86	1.38	8.71	1.83
Cuban	148,709	3.61	2.79	4.20	5.60	1.93	11.32	2.90
Mexican	3,341,893	3.76	0.95	5.80	0.92	1.02	9.99	3.87
Puerto Rican <sup>b</sup>	537,849	5.41	5.52	5.37	10.19	2.51	11.56	2.66
Asian Ethnicities:								
Chinese <sup>c</sup>	234,500	0.44	0.30	0.65	1.39	0.13	4.73	0.36
Korean	111,945	0.54	0.38	0.94	0.58	0.37	2.05	0.82
Indian	131,726	0.55	0.29	0.99	0.27	0.29	6.69	0.48
Filipino	202,216	0.83	0.51	1.23	2.13	0.28	4.76	0.82
Vietnamese	135,447	1.36	0.65	5.60	1.56	0.46	16.18	2.85
Lao, Hmong, Cambodian	67,384	2.07	1.12	7.26	2.84	0.47	9.11	5.80

**Table 3** (*Continued*)

Ethnicity (self-reported)	Total males, ages 18–39 <sup>a</sup>		Incarcerated by nativity:		Percent incarcerated, by nativity and education:			
			Foreign- born <sup>a</sup>	U.S.- born	If Foreign-born <sup>a</sup>		If U.S.-born	
					High School Graduate?		High School Graduate?	
	N	%	%	%	No	Yes	No	Yes
Other:								
White, non-Hispanic	28,353,071	1.69	0.86	1.71	2.02	0.69	4.76	1.23
Black, non-Hispanic	5,203,551	11.31	3.68	11.61	11.11	1.81	22.25	7.65

**Source:** 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS.

<sup>a</sup>Data are estimates for adult males, ages 18 to 39, in correctional institutions at the time of the 2000 census; foreign-born males are restricted to those who arrived in the U.S. as children under 18.

<sup>b</sup>Island-born Puerto Ricans are classified as “foreign born” for purposes of this table, and mainland-born Puerto Ricans as “U.S.-born.”

<sup>c</sup>Including Hong Kong and Taiwan.

whose rate increases from 0.65 among the foreign-born to 5.6 per cent among the U.S.-born; and for the Laotians and Cambodians, whose rate moves up to 7.26 per cent, the highest of any groups except for native blacks.

The risk of imprisonment is clearly highest for native-born men who are high school dropouts. Among the U.S.-born, 9.75 per cent of all male dropouts 18 to 39 were in jail or prison in 2000, compared to 2.23 per cent among those who had graduated from high school. But among the foreign-born, the incarceration gap by education was much narrower: only 1.9 per cent of immigrant men who were high school dropouts were incarcerated, compared to 0.84 per cent of those with at least a high school diploma. The advantage for immigrants held when broken down by education for every ethnic group (a main exception are island-born Puerto Rican dropouts, whose incarceration rate was above 10 per cent)—indeed, *for every group, the longer immigrants had resided in the U.S., the higher were their incarceration rates* (data not shown in Table 3, but available upon request). Among U.S.-born men who had not finished high school, the highest incarceration rate by far was seen among non-Hispanic blacks, 22.25 per cent of whom were imprisoned at the time of the census; that rate was double the 11.1 per cent among foreign-born black dropouts. Other high rates among U.S.-born high school dropouts were observed among the Vietnamese (over 16 per cent), followed by Cubans and Puerto Ricans (over 11 per cent), Mexicans (10 per cent), and Laotians and Cambodians (over 9 per cent).

#### *Early childbearing and young women*

Data from the 2000 Census show that nationally, twice as many women 20–24 who were high school dropouts had borne a child as women who were high school graduates (29 to 15 per cent); and more than twice as many women 25–29 with a high school degree or less had become parents than women who were college graduates (45 to 20 per cent). Young women who have children early were also much more likely to be poor than those who delay childbearing.

Table 4 presents 2000 census data to examine patterns of childbearing among immigrant and native women, ages 15 to 29, for the same national-origin groups as in the previous tables; the foreign-born in the table are restricted to the ‘1.5 generation’ of those who arrived in the U.S. as children under 15. (Were foreign-born women who arrived as young adults included in these data, the fertility differentials between natives and immigrants would be even wider.) For every age interval (15–19, 20–24, 25–29), and for every ethnic group, *the foreign-born have more children, and earlier, than do U.S.-born females*. The pattern of ethnic segmentation observed previously with respect to

**Table 4.** *Percent of Females 15 to 29 Years Old with Own Children, 2000: Foreign-born ( Who Arrived in U.S. as Children) vs. U.S.-born, in Rank Order by Ethnicity*

Ethnicity (self-reported)	Foreign-born females <sup>a</sup>			U.S.-born females			Total
	15–19	20–24	25–29	15–19	20–24	25–29	Ages 15–29
Total:	3.3	19.7	40.4	2.6	17.4	38.7	18.8
Latin American Ethnicities:							
Colombian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian	2.3	14.9	32.5	1.5	10.6	23.3	12.7
Cuban	2.3	18.1	35.4	1.8	11.4	28.1	15.1
Dominican	3.7	20.3	43.8	2.7	16.4	34.4	18.0
Salvadoran, Guatemalan	4.5	22.9	48.7	3.0	16.5	33.4	22.1
Puerto Rican <sup>b</sup>	6.4	28.6	48.1	4.1	23.8	45.2	23.4
Mexican	5.5	30.2	55.6	5.0	25.2	45.6	25.0
Asian Ethnicities:							
Chinese <sup>c</sup>	0.3	1.9	12.4	0.4	0.9	5.9	3.5
Korean	0.5	3.9	14.6	0.2	2.8	8.7	5.0
Indian	0.7	4.3	22.1	0.6	1.6	9.6	5.7
Vietnamese	0.7	8.5	20.3	0.5	2.7	15.1	8.6
Filipino	1.6	11.2	28.9	1.6	7.3	21.4	11.0
Lao, Hmong, Cambodian	3.0	23.5	49.7	2.8	11.9	15.9	18.6
Other:							
White, non-Hispanic	1.2	10.8	30.5	1.9	15.6	37.7	17.9
Black, non-Hispanic	1.9	13.8	32.7	4.5	22.5	42.3	21.6

**Source:** 2000 U.S. Census, 5% PUMS.

<sup>a</sup>Data are estimates for females, ages 15 to 29, who had one or more children at the time of the 2000 census. Figures for foreign-born females are restricted to those who arrived in the U.S. as children under 15.

<sup>b</sup>Island-born Puerto Ricans are classified as “foreign born” for purposes of this table, and mainland-born Puerto Ricans as “U.S.-born.”

<sup>c</sup>Including Hong Kong and Taiwan.

education and incarceration emerges here as well. The Chinese, Korean, Indian and Vietnamese, and to a lesser extent the Filipinos, had much lower proportions of teenage childbearing (less than 1 per cent) than any of the Latin American groups, as well as much lower fertility generally throughout the twenties. Except for the Laotians and Cambodians, all the other Asian groups were much less likely to have had a child at any age between 15 and 29 than were non-Hispanic white or black natives. Among young Latin American women, the Cubans and South Americans were least likely to become mothers early, with the Dominicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the middle, and the Puerto Ricans and Mexicans exhibiting the highest proportions of early childbearing.

### **The CILS sample in Southern California**

In the analysis that follows, I draw on data from the California portion of the CILS, a decade-long panel study whose last phase of data collection ended in 2003. As detailed in the Introduction to this Special Issue, the CILS study has followed the progress of a representative sample of youths, drawn in autumn 1991, who at that time resided in two main areas of immigrant settlement in the United States: Southern California (San Diego) and South Florida (Miami-Dade and Broward Counties). About half the baseline sample attended schools in the San Diego Unified School District ( $N = 2,420$ ). The principal nationalities represented in the San Diego sample were Mexican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Laotian (Lao and Hmong), Cambodian, Chinese (including families from Hong Kong and Taiwan), and smaller groups of other children of immigrants from Asia (mostly Indian, Japanese and Korean) and Latin America (including virtually all Central and South American countries, and several from the Caribbean). Their parents ranged from undocumented labourers to well-educated professionals to political refugees, with sharply contrasting socio-economic origins, migration histories, and contexts of exit and of reception. Indeed, the San Diego sample included ethnic groups with the highest poverty rates in the United States (the Hmong and the Cambodians) and the lowest poverty rate (the Filipinos), and with the lowest educational attainment in the United States (the Mexicans) and the highest (the Indians and Taiwanese). Remarkably, although contemporary immigrants in the U.S. have come from scores of different nationalities, 40 per cent comprise just four groups, the Mexicans (by far the largest), Filipinos, Chinese and Vietnamese, and children of immigrants from those four groups make up the majority of the San Diego sample, which will be the focus of the results presented below.



They were first surveyed in spring 1992 when they were in 8<sup>th</sup> or 9<sup>th</sup> grade and most were 14 or 15 years old; and then again three years later, when most were in their final year of senior high school (or had dropped out of school) and were 17 or 18 years old — a follow-up effort which in San Diego succeeded in re-interviewing 85.2 per cent of the baseline sample. We obtained complete academic histories for them from the school system, including data on achievement test scores, GPAs, suspensions, language status, transfers outside the school district ('inactive' status) and official dropout status; we collected census tract-level data on the social and economic characteristics of the San Diego neighbourhoods where they grew up; and we also conducted separate in-depth interviews with their parents (in their native languages). Results from the first two waves of surveys (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut and Portes 2001) told a story that ended just before the end of high school, when almost all of them were still living at home with their parents. The latest survey, carried out during 2001–03, sought to find what had happened to them since, during the critical years from 18 to the mid twenties (most were now 24 or 25), when they were making their transitions to adult statuses: leaving the parental home, completing their formal education, entering into full-time work, forming families of their own, and coping with the tangle of circumstances of a period of the life course often characterized by a great deal of conflict and change. By re-interviewing the sample at this time – six to seven years since the last survey, and a decade after the first one — we have created a unique data set which can help to provide substantive answers to a key set of theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant questions.

By the end of the third wave of data collection we had processed 1,480 completed surveys and another 22 with significant but partially completed data — a retrieval rate of 73 per cent of the 1995 San Diego sample of 2,063, and 62 per cent of the original sample of 2,420. We found that seven of our original respondents had died (all young men, two of them in gang shootings); and cross-checked survey reports about whether any had been or were currently incarcerated through a complete check of federal prison, California State Department of Corrections, and local county jail records against all of our 2,420 respondents. Additional information from other sources was compiled for 182 respondents from whom we were unable to retrieve completed surveys — including confirmed data on college and university enrolment, marriage and children, having joined the military, and bankruptcy filings.

In the end, only in 10 per cent of the cases (242 out of the original 2,420) were we unable to obtain longitudinal survey data beyond the baseline survey of 1992 (although even for them we did obtain later school data). In the other 90 per cent of the cases, we have longitudinal

survey data on hand, in most cases across a full decade, and also in most cases supplemented by separate interviews we conducted with their parents in 1995–96. For our purposes here, however, we focus on the 1,502 cases for whom we have the most complete longitudinal data over the span of a decade. From those cases we also carried out in-depth open-ended interviews with a subsample of 134 of our San Diego respondents, which were taped, transcribed and coded via special computer software for qualitative analysis. Selections from these San Diego oral histories are incorporated in two of the articles that follow (see Feliciano and Rumbaut, and Zhou, in this Issue).

As was the case with the last follow-up of the South Florida sample, we observed a moderate but significant bias in the final San Diego sample. In both sites, ten years later, there was an overrepresentation of youth from higher-status intact families (both natural parents present at home in early adolescence) and of those who had higher academic grade point averages in junior high school. Accordingly, we adjusted the latest results to correct for sample attrition bias on the basis of established statistical methods, employing coefficients from a logistic regression model predicting presence/absence in the follow-up survey, in the same manner as the statistical adjustments were carried out for the Florida-based data (presented in the article by Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller in this Issue). Table 5 displays both the unadjusted and adjusted univariate results for an array of key social and economic characteristics and outcomes of our sample in early adulthood. As can be seen, the adjusted means are generally quite close to the unadjusted figures and in any event do not alter the substantive conclusions. The multivariate models that are presented later use the unadjusted data but control in each model for those variables measured in 1992 which were found to predict sample attrition a decade later (family structure, parental SES, and GPA).

### **Bivariate results by national origin and gender**

#### *Antecedent variables, 1991–1995*

To provide a point of comparison for the multivariate analyses that follow, Table 6 presents a baseline profile of demographic, socio-economic, and educational characteristics of the original 2,420 respondents and their families, showing the extent of their differences by national origin. The baseline sample in San Diego, with a mean age of 14.2, was divided exactly evenly by gender. By nativity, 56 per cent were foreign-born ('1.5 generation') and 44 per cent were U.S.-born ('2<sup>nd</sup> generation'); in 15 per cent of the cases the U.S.-born respondent also had one U.S.-born parent ('2.5 generation') (see Rumbaut

**Table 5.** *Selected Characteristics of Children of Immigrants in Early Adulthood, 2001–03: Univariate Statistics, Unadjusted and Adjusted for Sample Attrition*

Variable	Unadjusted (mean/percent)	Adjusted (mean/percent)
Demographics:		
Sex (female)	53.5	50.1
Age (years)	24.2	24.2
Current residence, location:		
Percent living with parents	52.4	51.3
Percent in San Diego	74.4	74.4
Percent elsewhere in California	19.1	19.0
Percent outside California (27 states)	6.6	6.6
Education:		
Average years completed	14.2	14.0
Percent less than high school	4.8	6.3
Percent high school only	20.6	23.1
Percent college graduate or more	23.4	19.8
Percent still attending school	48.5	47.0
Employment:		
Percent employed full-time	57.9	59.5
Percent employed part-time	22.8	21.5
Percent unemployed	8.0	8.3
Percent self-employed	4.2	4.4
Occupational prestige (Treiman) score	41.9	41.3
Economic situation:		
Average annual personal income, \$	\$21,060	\$21,048
Average annual family income, \$	\$50,666	\$48,355
Percent received cash assistance, last year	3.7	3.9
Percent does not have health insurance	30.3	31.9
Percent home owners (self or parents)	23.2	22.5
Family:		
Percent married	18.3	19.8
Percent cohabitating	6.0	6.4
Percent with children	24.0	26.8
Average number of children (if has children)	1.5	1.5
Percent females with children	28.8	32.5
Criminal Justice System:		
Percent arrested, last six years	9.5	10.8
Percent incarcerated, last six years	6.5	7.5
Percent males arrested, last six years	16.6	18.0
Percent males incarcerated, last six years	11.9	13.2
Language preference and proficiency:		
Percent prefers English only	64.7	61.2
Percent prefers other language	2.6	2.8

**Table 5** (*Continued*)

Variable	Unadjusted (mean/percent)	Adjusted (mean/percent)
Percent speaks English very well	83.6	82.7
Percent speaks other language very well	33.7	37.1
Percent reads English very well	84.1	82.9
Percent reads other language very well	24.0	26.5
Religious ties:		
Percent never attends church	18.3	18.8
Percent attends church often, regularly	32.6	31.5
Percent Catholic	53.5	52.9
Percent Buddhist	14.7	15.1
Percent Protestant	3.7	3.4
Political ties:		
Percent not a U.S. citizen	16.4	16.7
Percent not registered to vote	41.8	44.1
Percent no political party interest	52.2	53.0
Percent Democrat	31.3	30.9
Percent Republican	13.8	13.4
Home country ties:		
Percent has never traveled to parents' country	43.0	43.5
Percent has traveled three or more times to parents' home country	24.5	25.6
Percent has never sent remittances abroad	71.9	71.7
Percent send remittances at least yearly	19.9	20.0
Percent says United States feels most like "home"	87.6	87.2

**Source:** Children of Immigrants longitudinal study (CILS), third wave survey, San Diego sample.

2002, 2004). Table 6 also presents data, for the main national-origin groups in San Diego, on their family structure, their parents' level of education and home ownership, and poverty rates of the neighborhoods where they lived — key factors expected to shape the children's socio-economic trajectories in early adulthood, as elaborated in our theoretical framework (see Portes *et al.* in this Issue).

In 1992, over two thirds of these youths lived with both their natural parents—ranging from more than three-fourths of the Chinese and Filipinos and over 70 per cent of the Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians, to 59 per cent of the Mexicans and less than half of the other Latin Americans. The modest family origins of many of these children, the highly educated backgrounds of the parents of others, and their varying patterns homeownership and poverty, are all reflected in the CILS sample. Only a small proportion of Mexican and Indochinese

**Table 6.** *Characteristics of Adolescent Children of Immigrants and their Families in San Diego, 1991–95, by National Origin*

Characteristics (in percents unless noted)	National Origin							
	Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	Total
(N =)	727	808	361	301	52	82	89	2,420
Demographics:								
Female	49.2	50.1	47.6	52.8	50.0	50.0	56.2	50.0
Age (years), 1992:	14.2	14.2	14.3	14.5	14.1	14.1	14.3	14.2
Nativity (of self, parents):								
Foreign-born	40.2	45.8	84.8	96.7	50.0	45.1	50.6	56.5
US-born	59.8	54.2	15.2	3.3	50.0	54.9	49.4	43.5
One parent born in U.S.	17.6	19.3	2.5	0.3	15.4	46.3	27.0	15.0
Family structure, 1992:								
Intact family	59.0	79.3	73.1	72.1	76.9	69.5	46.1	69.8
Step family	14.3	9.3	3.9	7.0	3.8	8.5	21.3	10.0
Single parent, other	26.7	11.4	23.0	20.9	19.2	22.0	32.6	20.2
Parents' level of education:								
Under 12 years, father	67.3	15.2	62.0	73.4	38.5	8.5	24.7	45.7
Under 12 years, mother	73.9	21.0	69.8	83.4	32.7	18.3	33.7	52.6
College graduate, father	6.3	29.1	14.4	7.0	34.6	43.9	30.3	18.0
College graduate, mother	3.7	38.2	8.3	3.3	30.8	23.2	24.7	17.9
Homeownership, 1992:								
Rented	68.8	26.4	66.2	84.1	23.1	40.2	59.6	53.8
Owned	31.2	73.6	33.8	15.9	76.9	59.8	40.4	46.2

**Table 6** (*Continued*)

Characteristics (in percents unless noted)	National Origin							
	Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	Total
(N =)	727	808	361	301	52	82	89	2,420
Neighborhood poverty rate, 1990:								
Under 15%	8.0	58.6	34.8	6.0	46.4	64.5	27.8	35.3
Over 50%	48.3	1.9	28.1	62.1	3.6	6.5	19.4	24.9
Suspended from school, 1991–1995: <sup>a</sup>								
Female	17.6	8.6	5.2	6.9	0.0	9.8	12.0	10.6
Male	36.3	18.1	33.0	24.6	7.7	22.0	41.0	27.4
Total	27.1	13.4	19.6	15.3	3.9	15.9	24.7	19.0
<i>If Yes</i> , how many times?	1.9	1.7	2.0	1.3	2.0	2.1	1.6	1.8
<i>If Yes</i> , total days suspended	4.5	3.8	5.1	3.9	5.0	4.3	4.5	4.3
Classified as Inactive: <sup>b</sup>								
By Fall 1993	12.7	7.9	7.7	6.3	2.0	15.9	18.0	9.6
By Fall 1994	21.6	14.5	14.1	12.6	3.9	18.3	24.7	16.6
By Fall 1995	26.7	17.6	18.2	17.6	3.9	23.2	31.5	20.8
National percentile in achievement tests in 8th or 9th grade, 1991: <sup>c</sup>								
Math	30.7	58.9	60.1	37.5	81.0	62.7	46.4	48.2
Reading	25.7	51.1	37.2	18.0	63.7	61.2	50.4	38.3

**Table 6** (*Continued*)

Characteristics (in percents unless noted)	National Origin							Total
	Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	
(N =)	727	808	361	301	52	82	89	2,420
GPA by end of high school, 1995: <sup>d</sup>								
Female	2.40	3.10	3.31	2.93	3.70	3.16	2.98	2.91
Male	2.09	2.63	2.76	2.49	3.70	3.15	2.44	2.50
Total	2.24	2.86	3.02	2.72	3.70	3.16	2.74	2.71

**Source:** Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), San Diego baseline sample; Rumbaut (2000).

<sup>a</sup>School suspensions for any reason between Fall 1991 and Spring 1995, collected from the school system for the full baseline sample.

<sup>b</sup>“Inactive” status is a school district classification for students who transferred out of the district for whatever reason; most involve moves to other school districts, but also includes students leaving school and official dropouts. “Active” students are those currently enrolled.

<sup>c</sup>Standardized Stanford Achievement Test scores collected by the San Diego school system in Fall 1991, when the students were in the 8th or 9th grade. The figures given are national percentiles.

<sup>d</sup>Academic grade point averages (GPA) collected annually from the school system; mean GPA shown is by the end of high school in 1995 (or latest).

fathers and mothers had college degrees in 1992, well below the 1990 U.S. norm of 20 per cent for adults 25 and over. By contrast, 38 per cent of Filipino mothers had college degrees, as did a third of Chinese fathers and mothers, and 44 per cent of the 'other Asian' fathers, all well above national norms. The contrast is made even sharper by the proportion of parents with less than a high school education — that is, less than what their children have now already achieved. Between two-thirds and four-fifths of the foreign-born children from Mexico, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had fathers and mothers who never completed secondary-level schooling. There was a huge gap between ethnic groups in their proportion of home-owners, ranging from 15 per cent among Laotians and Cambodians to over 75 per cent of the Chinese and Filipinos. And neighbourhood poverty rates were wider still: the proportion of children growing up in inner-city neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty (where more than 50 per cent of all residents were below the poverty line) ranged from over three-fifths (62 per cent) of the Cambodian and Laotian children, about half of the Mexican children (48 per cent), and 28 per cent of the Vietnamese, to only 4 per cent of the Chinese and 2 per cent of the Filipinos.

These differences in socio-economic status between the poorest groups (the Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians) and the better off (the Chinese, Filipinos and 'other Asians') are partly reflected in objective measures of school attainment summarized at the bottom of Table 6. Those measures of the children's educational progress between the end of junior high to the end of high school include the number of suspensions and of days suspended from school (from 1991 to 1995), the per cent classified by the school system as 'inactive' annually from 1993 to 1995, national percentiles in math and reading (Stanford) achievement test scores in 1991–92, and final high school GPA (or latest, if the student left before graduation). For some of these outcomes, the data are also broken down by gender when significant differences were observed.

Suspending a student from school for one or more days is, except for expulsion, the most severe official reaction to student disciplinary infractions. Nearly 80 per cent of the suspensions in the San Diego Unified School District were meted out for physical injury (fights, threats, attempts) and disruption/defiance; others included drugs, property damage, and weapons infractions (Rumbaut 2000). As Table 6 shows, nearly a fifth (19 per cent) of the students were suspended at least once throughout their junior and senior high school years — *below* the suspension rate for the school district as a whole — including 27 per cent of the males compared to only 11 per cent of the females. There were also very significant differences between ethnic groups, ranging from the Chinese (with the lowest proportion suspended,



3.9 per cent) to the Mexican youth (27 per cent were suspended at least once).

'Inactive' status (shown yearly from autumn 1993 to 1995) is a school classification for students who transferred out of the district for whatever reason prior to graduation and were no longer currently enrolled; many involve moves to other school districts, but the category also includes transiency and students leaving school due to a variety of problems (including pregnancy) as well as official dropouts. Frequent moves across school districts have been associated with academic underachievement (Ream 2004). Again stark differences were noticeable between the Chinese (by far the most stable, with only 3.9 per cent classified as inactive by 1995 and *none* who were officially recorded as having dropped out of school by the end of high school), and the Mexicans and other Latin Americans (with the highest inactivity and dropout rates). It should be noted that a significantly greater proportion of students district-wide dropped out of school than did the youth from immigrant families. The multi-year dropout rate for grades 9–12 in the San Diego Unified School District was 16.2 per cent, nearly triple the rate of 5.7 per cent for the CILS sample – that is, of the 2,420 students who were originally surveyed in 1992 in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> grades, only 5.7 per cent were officially determined to have dropped out of school at any point by 1996, including a high of 8.8 per cent among Mexican-origin youth. CILS dropout rates were also lower than the district-wide rate for preponderantly native non-Hispanic white high school students (10.5 per cent). And since the district-wide figures by definition include all students, both the children of immigrants and of non-immigrants, this may be a conservative estimate of the extent to which the children of immigrants were more apt to stay in high school overall (Rumbaut 2000; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Already by 8<sup>th</sup> grade there were large ethnic differences observed in standardized math and reading achievement test scores. The Chinese collectively scored at the 81<sup>st</sup> percentile nationally on math, compared to the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile for the Vietnamese and Filipinos and the 31<sup>st</sup> percentile for the Mexican-origin students. The Cambodians and Laotians (who were also the most recent arrivals) scored lowest on reading achievement (at the 18<sup>th</sup> percentile collectively). On opposite sides of the spectrum in academic GPAs were the Chinese (averaging 3.70) and the Mexican-origin students (2.24). Except for the Chinese and 'other Asians' (for whom GPA rates were virtually identical for males and females) there were significant differences in high school GPA by gender, with females outperforming males by wide margins (2.91 to 2.50 overall) – gender differentials of nearly half a grade point were observed for most ethnic groups.

*Outcome variables, 2001–2003*

A cross-tabulation of CILS-III results — and of patterns of segmented assimilation—by national-origin and gender is presented in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 focuses on marital and residential status, childbearing, and experiences with the criminal justice system (arrests and incarceration); and Table 8 on educational attainment and labour force status. Note that the data in Tables 7 and 8 are for the 1992–2003 longitudinal sample; the same respondents are reflected in each of these tables. Multivariate models are then presented in Tables 9 and 10 to examine determinants of educational attainment, incarceration, and childbearing, by their mid twenties.

In the third wave of surveys we found that almost three fourths of our respondents (whose mean age was 24.2, ranging from 23 to 27) had remained in the San Diego area, but a fifth (19 per cent) had moved to other parts of California, and another 7 per cent were located in 27 other states plus the District of Columbia and a handful of military bases overseas. Just over half (52 per cent) still lived in their parents' home. As Table 7 shows, 60 per cent of the Filipinos (who were also the most affluent group) still resided in their parents' home, in contrast to less than half of the Mexicans and other Latin Americans. The Chinese were comparatively more likely than the other ethnic groups to have left San Diego and gone to Los Angeles or northern California or to other states, typically in pursuit of higher education, while the Vietnamese were the most likely to have remained in San Diego.

Overall only 18 per cent of the sample was married, and another 6 per cent cohabiting. About a fourth already had children of their own by age 24—including 29 per cent of the women, 13 per cent of whom had their first child between ages 15 and 20. The Mexicans and the Cambodians and Laotians (who were also the poorest groups), were much more likely to be married and to have children, to have had children between the ages of 15 and 20, and, among those with children, to have had *more* children (as many as 5 children by the time of the survey). Indeed, *none* of the Chinese had had any children to date, compared with 42 per cent of the Mexicans, a fourth of the Laotians and Cambodians, and a fifth of the Filipinos. Among those with children, only half were married; 23 per cent were single, 13 per cent were cohabiting, 7 per cent were engaged, and another 7 per cent were already divorced or separated. The women were much more likely than the men to be married (26 to 13 per cent) and to have children (29 to 18 per cent)—the sole exception being Vietnamese women, who were much *less* likely to have had a child than Vietnamese men. Nearly half the Mexican women (48 per cent) and over a third of Cambodian and Laotian women (especially the Hmong) had become mothers by

**Table 7.** Residential, Marital, Childbearing, and Incarceration Outcomes in Early Adulthood, 2001–03, by National Origin

		National Origin							Total
Characteristics	(N =)	Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	
(in percents unless noted)		408	586	194	186	35	46	47	1,502
Age (years), 2001–03:		24.2	24.1	24.1	24.4	23.6	23.8	23.8	24.2
Current Residence, Location:									
Parents' home		44.8	59.9	52.6	50.5	45.7	51.1	38.3	52.4
San Diego		75.1	73.5	82.0	75.1	57.1	63.6	67.4	74.4
California, other		21.4	19.5	15.3	13.5	31.4	20.5	19.6	19.1
Other (27) states		3.5	6.9	2.6	11.4	11.4	15.9	13.0	6.6
Marriage, children:									
Currently married:									
	Female	39.0	21.7	9.7	31.7	6.3	12.5	17.2	25.6
	Male	23.5	11.9	5.4	12.0	0	5.0	6.7	13.4
Had a child:									
	Female	47.5	24.5	5.2	34.3	0	16.7	16.1	28.7
	Male	34.1	14.0	12.9	14.5	0	5.0	13.3	18.5
Had a child at age 15–20:									
	Female	20.5	9.9	3.1	18.6	0	8.3	3.2	12.6
	Male	11.2	2.9	3.2	4.8	0	0	0	5.1

**Table 7** (*Continued*)

		National Origin							Total
		Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	
Characteristics (in percents unless noted)	(N =)	408	586	194	186	35	46	47	1,502
<b>Criminal justice system:</b>									
<b>Was arrested:</b>									
	Female	5.0	2.3	1.0	1.0	0	4.2	0	2.7
	Male	28.2	9.3	16.7	9.5	5.3	19.0	18.8	15.8
	Foreign-born	21.9	10.0	16.0	8.6	0	14.3	10.0	12.9
	U.S.-born	31.5	8.8	20.0	33.3	11.1	21.4	33.3	19.0
<b>Was incarcerated:</b>									
	Female	2.7	1.3	1.0	0	0	4.2	0	1.5
	Male	20.2	6.8	14.6	9.5	0	9.5	18.8	11.9
	Foreign-born	14.1	7.5	13.6	8.6	0	0.0	10.0	9.9
	U.S.-born	23.4	6.3	20.0	33.3	0	14.3	33.3	14.2
<b>Family member was arrested:</b>									
		36.1	13.9	11.6	11.9	2.9	9.1	15.2	19.0
	Foreign-born	27.7	10.6	10.6	11.1	6.3	14.3	10.0	13.8
	U.S.-born	40.7	16.4	15.8	40.0	0	6.7	19.2	24.6
<b>Family member was incarcerated:</b>									
		28.6	11.7	9.0	10.3	2.9	6.8	8.7	15.3
	Foreign-born	19.9	9.8	7.3	9.4	6.3	7.1	10.0	10.9
	U.S.-born	33.3	13.1	15.8	40.0	0	6.7	7.7	19.9

**Source:** Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), third wave survey, 2001–03, San Diego-drawn sample.

age 24, compared to a fourth of Filipino women and only 5 per cent of Vietnamese women. Mexican men (34 per cent) had become fathers at far higher rates than males in any of the other ethnic groups. Rates of teen pregnancies and childbearing are also documented in Table 7: about a fifth of Mexican, Laotian and Cambodian females, and 11 per cent of Mexican-origin males, became parents when they were between the ages of 15 and 20.

Being arrested and incarcerated for criminal behaviours, on the other hand, is an overwhelmingly male experience, as Table 7 also shows. Overall, 16 per cent of the males but less than 3 per cent of the women had been arrested by the police, and 12 per cent of the men but less than 2 per cent of the women had been imprisoned (which in most cases involved being convicted and sentenced for the commission of a crime; data from the intensive open-ended interviews showed a wide range of arrest charges ranging from property crimes and drug use to assault and violent crimes, and even one instance of an arrest for protesting against anti-immigrant legislation in the Los Angeles area). Moreover, among males who were arrested and incarcerated, the U.S.-born (2<sup>nd</sup> generation) were significantly more likely to have become ensnared with the criminal justice system than the foreign-born (the 1.5 generation), reflecting the national-level patterns among adult men between the ages of 18 and 39 noted earlier.

Significantly, Mexican Americans were about twice as likely to report having been arrested and incarcerated as all of the other groups, as well as reporting that family members had been arrested and incarcerated. For example, 28 per cent of Mexican-origin men in our sample reported having been arrested, and 20 per cent reported having been incarcerated, since 1995 — i.e., between the ages of 18 and 24 — a notably higher proportion than Vietnamese men, who came next at 17 per cent arrested and 15 per cent incarcerated. By contrast, the reported degree of arrest and incarceration among the Laotians and Cambodians was just under 10 per cent. Given the huge size of the Mexican-origin second generation compared to all other groups in the United States, this is a finding fraught with implications for the future — not only for the downward mobility prospects of the individuals who are caught in a cycle of arrest and imprisonment, all the more given high rates of recidivism after release, but also for the effects on their ethnic communities when the prisoners return home.

Table 8 shifts analytical attention to the educational progress and labour force status of these young adults, again broken down by national origin and gender. For this age group, the overall totals reflect national norms. By 2001–03 the sample as a whole had completed an average of 14.2 years of education (two years of college) — although this should not be considered a final level of attainment, given the large proportion still going to school — ranging from just over

**Table 8.** *Educational Attainment and Employment Outcomes in Early Adulthood, 2001–03, by National Origin and Gender*

		National Origin						
Characteristics (in percents unless noted)		Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America
(N =)		408	586	194	186	35	46	47
Education attained (in mean years):								
	Female	13.5	14.8	15.5	13.5	15.5	15.0	14.6
	Male	13.3	14.3	14.3	13.1	15.3	15.4	14.0
	Total	13.4	14.5	14.9	13.3	15.4	15.2	14.4
Education attained (in percents):								
Females:								
	Some high school	5.9	2.0	0	6.0	0	0	0
	High school graduate	29.7	10.3	4.2	38.0	6.3	13.0	22.6
	Some college	58.0	52.7	41.7	38.0	50.0	39.10	45.2
	College graduate	5.0	29.0	46.9	17.0	25.0	39.1	22.6
	Graduate school	1.4	6.0	7.3	1.0	18.8	8.7	9.7
Males:								
	Some high school	12.9	1.8	8.6	7.6	0	0	12.5
	High school graduate	28.7	17.9	12.9	44.3	5.6	5.0	18.8
	Some college	47.8	62.0	49.5	39.2	44.4	50.0	37.5
	College graduate	9.0	16.4	28.0	8.9	44.4	35.0	25.0
	Graduate school	1.7	1.8	1.1	0.0	5.6	10.0	6.3
Total:								
	Some high school	9.1	1.9	4.2	6.7	0	0	4.3
	High school graduate	29.2	13.9	8.5	40.8	5.8	9.3	21.3

**Table 8** (*Continued*)

Characteristics (in percents unless noted)		National Origin							Total
		Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	
	(N =)	408	586	194	186	35	46	47	1,502
	Some college	53.4	57.1	45.5	38.5	47.1	44.2	42.6	51.3
	College graduate	6.8	23.0	37.6	13.4	35.3	37.2	23.4	20.0
	Graduate school	1.5	4.0	4.2	0.6	11.8	9.3	8.5	3.4
Currently attending school:									
	Female	43.6	52.0	61.5	40.2	93.8	54.2	41.9	49.8
	Male	34.6	57.9	44.1	38.6	50.0	60.0	40.0	47.1
	Total	39.4	54.8	52.9	39.5	70.6	56.8	41.3	48.5
Type of school currently attending:									
Females:									
	Vocational, other	7.8	7.2	6.3	9.8	6.3	4.2	0	7.2
	2-year college	21.0	15.1	16.7	15.7	12.5	16.7	19.4	17.2
	4-year college	13.7	22.7	32.3	13.7	43.8	25.0	16.1	20.5
	Graduate school	0.9	6.9	6.3	1.0	31.3	8.3	6.5	4.9
	<i>Not attending</i>	56.6	48.0	38.5	59.8	6.3	45.8	58.1	50.3
Males:									
	Vocational, other	10.6	12.2	7.5	12.0	0	0	20.0	10.6
	2-year college	14.0	16.5	9.7	15.7	0	15.0	6.7	14.1
	4-year college	8.9	26.6	20.4	9.6	36.8	35.0	13.3	19.4
	Graduate school	1.1	2.5	6.5	1.2	10.5	10.0	0	2.9
	<i>Not attending</i>	65.4	42.1	55.9	61.4	52.6	40.0	60.0	53.0

**Table 8** (*Continued*)

		National Origin							Total
Characteristics (in percents unless noted)	(N =)	Mexico	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia, Laos	China, Taiwan	Asia, other	Other Latin America	
		408	586	194	186	35	46	47	1,502
Total:									
	Vocational, other	9.0	9.6	6.9	10.8	2.9	2.3	6.5	8.8
	2-year college	17.8	15.8	13.2	15.7	5.7	15.9	15.2	15.8
	4-year college	11.6	24.6	26.5	11.9	40.0	29.5	15.2	19.9
	Graduate school	1.0	4.8	6.3	1.1	20.0	9.1	4.3	4.0
	<i>Not attending</i>	60.6	45.2	47.1	60.5	31.4	43.2	58.7	51.5
Attending school full-time:									
	Female	5.1	7.9	14.6	4.0	43.8	20.8	3.2	8.4
	Male	1.1	6.1	8.8	6.1	5.6	10.0	6.7	5.3
	Total	3.3	7.1	11.8	4.9	23.5	15.9	4.3	6.9
Employed full-time:									
	Female	58.3	49.8	45.8	67.3	37.5	54.2	58.1	54.1
	Male	74.7	57.8	52.7	69.5	38.9	50.0	60.0	62.3
	Total	65.7	53.6	49.2	68.3	38.2	52.3	58.7	57.9

**Source:** Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), third wave survey, 2001–03, San Diego-drawn sample.



13 years for the Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians, to over 15 years for the Chinese and 'other Asians'. Only about 5 per cent of the sample remained high school dropouts (the Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians had somewhat higher rates), while at the other end, almost 4 per cent were in graduate school or had completed advanced degrees (with the Chinese disproportionately among them). About a fourth were college graduates (including nearly half of the Chinese and 'other Asians', with the Vietnamese closely following); a fourth had completed 3–4 years of college but had not graduated; and another fourth reported having attended college for only 1–2 years (disproportionately among them the Mexicans and Filipinos). One in five had finished their formal education after obtaining a high school diploma or a GED (including a high of 41 per cent of the Cambodians and Laotians and 29 per cent of the Mexicans).

However, as Table 8 shows, there were pronounced differences in educational attainment by gender as well as by ethnicity. Although many more women than men in our sample were married and had children — factors that correlate strongly with lower educational attainment — overall the women still outperformed the men just as they had in GPAs in junior high and high school. While 29 per cent of the men had attained no more than a high school degree or a GED (or less), only 22 per cent of the women had failed to go beyond the high school diploma. By contrast, 28 per cent of the women were college graduates (or more), compared to only 19 per cent of the men. There were some exceptions in this gender pattern by ethnicity: Filipino, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian women were in fact far more likely than their male co-ethnics to have graduated from college, by 2 to 1 margins: e.g., 35 per cent of Filipino women were college graduates, vs. 18 per cent of Filipino men; among the Cambodians and Laotians it was 18 per cent vs. 9 per cent in college graduation rates between females and males; and among the Vietnamese, the gender gap was 54 per cent to 29 per cent in favour of women. That 54 per cent figure was the highest for any of the main ethnic groups — although on closer inspection it turns out that the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam (who account for a fifth of the Vietnamese sample) are the highest achievers by far: 71 per cent of the Chinese-Vietnamese women were already college graduates, including 13 per cent who were in graduate school or who had already earned an advanced degree, well above the national average for all adults over 25, and even more so for cohorts with a mean age of 24. (It might be mentioned that, by the end of high school, the highest educational *expectations* in CILS were expressed by Vietnamese females — over a third expected to go to medical school, in fact. Six years later, the highest level of actual educational attainment had been earned by Vietnamese women, over half of whom were already college graduates, even if not in medical

school.) For other groups, however, the gender differentials were very close, suggesting no significant gaps by gender, although among the Mexicans and the Chinese there was a slight tendency for males to outperform females in college graduation rates: 11 to 6 per cent among the Mexican respondents (among the lowest of the national-origin groups, though the Hmong and Cambodians were lower still), and 50 to 44 per cent among the Chinese. (For a detailed analysis see Feliciano and Rumbaut in this Issue.)

About two-thirds of the Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians (the poorest groups, with the lowest educational attainment and the most children by age 24) were employed full time in 2001–03, in contrast to only about half of most of the others, many of whom were still enrolled in colleges or universities (especially the Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Vietnamese and ‘other Asians’). Indeed, an extraordinary 94 per cent of Chinese women in our sample were still attending colleges or universities — 44 per cent of them full time, and 31 per cent in graduate school — in stark contrast to only 7 per cent of the sample as a whole who were attending school full time, and only 4 per cent who were enrolled in graduate programmes. Among the half of the sample still enrolled in school, Table 8 documents an ethnic hierarchy between those groups attending vocational schools and 2-year community colleges, vs. those attending 4-year colleges and graduate or professional schools. These intergroup differences underscore the sharp ethnic and gender segmentation in their modes of achievement and socio-economic trajectories to date.

### **A multivariate analysis of educational attainment, incarceration, and early childbearing**

Table 9 presents a set of multiple linear regression models examining the effects of an array of predictor variables on total years of education attained by 2001–03 — the central variable of interest to this study of upward or downward mobility among children of immigrants — following the analyses previously elaborated in *Legacies* (see chs 8 and 9), but extended now into early adulthood. That is, factors leading to educational success or failure were hypothesized to consist of family structure, parental SES, and modes of incorporation experienced by different immigrant groups (as roughly indexed by the contexts of exit and reception of different nationalities), along with a number of individual characteristics. The predictor variables were measured either in 1991–92, or between 1991 and 1995, preceding the outcome variables by as long as ten years, and clearly establishing the temporal order of effects.

In the equations in Table 9, four sets of antecedent variables are entered sequentially into the analysis predicting years of education:

**Table 9.** *Regression of Years of Education Completed by 2001–03 on Predictors Measured in 1991–95, among Young Adult Children of Immigrants*

Predictors	Time Measured	I			II			III			IV			V		
		B	t <sup>a</sup>	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.
<i>Sex, Age, Ethnicity:</i>																
Female		0.420	4.88	***	0.460	5.55	***	0.2267	2.91	**	0.0073	0.10	NS	0.0747	0.98	NS
Age (years)		−0.305	−6.70	***	−0.225	−5.03	***	−0.162	−3.95	***	−0.097	−2.49	*	−0.074	−1.93	*
Mexican		−0.878	−6.61	***	−0.621	−4.78	***	−0.375	−3.11	**	−0.036	−0.31	NS	0.0247	0.22	NS
Cambodian		−1.447	−6.17	***	−1.000	−4.33	***	−0.842	−3.98	***	−0.573	−2.88	**	−0.608	−3.10	**
Filipino		0.243	1.96	*	−0.148	−1.17	NS	−0.151	−1.31	NS	−0.074	−0.67	NS	−0.054	−0.50	NS
Vietnamese		0.641	4.05	***	0.652	4.21	***	0.401	2.82	**	0.376	2.83	**	0.352	2.69	**
<i>Family Context:</i>																
Parental SES <sup>b</sup>	1992				0.570	8.79	***	0.370	6.11	***	0.2288	3.90	***	0.2205	3.80	***
Both parents at home	1992				0.269	2.73	**	0.264	2.93	**	0.224	2.66	**	0.155	1.86	†
One US-born parent	1992				−0.381	−3.21	**	−0.268	−2.46	*	−0.320	−3.12	**	−0.280	−2.77	**
N of siblings at home	1992				−0.122	−3.62	***	−0.105	−3.42	**	−0.076	−2.63	**	−0.066	−2.32	*
<i>Expectations, Effort:</i>																
Educational expectations	1992–95							0.686	14.27	***	0.454	9.53	***	0.402	8.45	***
Daily homework hours	1992–95							0.123	3.44	**	0.048	1.42	NS	0.0425	1.27	NS
Daily TV hours (4+)	1992–95							−0.002	−2.43	*	−0.002	−2.43	*	−0.002	−2.40	*
<i>Early Achievement:</i>																
Achievement test scores	1991										0.164	5.26	***	0.152	4.93	***
Academic GPA	1991–95										0.499	9.77	***	0.478	9.48	***
English proficiency index	1992–95										0.304	3.29	**	0.287	3.15	**
School suspensions	1991–95										−0.130	−2.74	**	−0.085	−1.78	†
<i>Turning Points:</i>																
Been incarcerated	2001–03													−0.465	−2.90	**
Number of children	2001–03													−0.332	−6.28	***

Table 9 (Continued)

Predictors	Time Measured	I			II			III			IV			V		
		B	t <sup>a</sup>	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.	B	t	Sig.
	Constant	21.431	19.24	***	19.745	17.89	***	15.092	14.37	***	11.635	10.93	***	11.576	11.05	***
	R <sup>2</sup> =		0.159			0.224			0.354			0.440			0.458	
N = 1,475																

**Source:** Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), third wave survey, San Diego-drawn sample, 2001–03.  
Significance: \*\*\*p < .001, \*\*p < .01, \*p < .05, †p < .10, NS = not significant.  
<sup>a</sup>Measure of strength of association (unstandardized regression coefficient divided by its standard error).  
<sup>b</sup>Standardized composite measure of father’s and mother’s education, occupation, and homeownership.

(1) age, sex, and ethnicity; (2) family structure and composition, and parental SES; (3) early educational expectations and behavioural indicators (hours of daily homework and TV watching), as theoretical mediators drawn from collective socialization theory (Ainsworth 2002); and (4) early achievement indicators (standardized math and reading test scores, GPA, a 4-item English proficiency index, and school suspensions). Educational attainment is well accounted for in these models: jointly the predictor variables explain nearly half of the variance in years of education completed ( $R^2 = .440$ ). Finally, added to the equation in the last panel of Table 9 are two key life change events—becoming a parent and having been incarcerated — hypothesized as turning points likely to derail post-secondary school trajectories. We are interested in examining their associations, but because these were also measured at the 2001–03 survey (ever been incarcerated, children ever borne), the temporal order of their effects on educational attainment cannot be clearly established (e.g., an individual could have left school prior to being imprisoned or having a child).

Given the significant differences in educational attainment by national origin and gender, the first model in Table 9 enters dummy variables for four key groups which index very different types of reception and incorporation. Controlling for age and gender, and compared to all other Asian and Latin American groups in the sample, the Mexicans and Cambodians have significant negative coefficients, while the Filipinos and the Vietnamese show significant positive effects. Gender (female) has a strong and significant effect on attainment, as expected. The negative effect of (older) age on achievement was also expected in a sample that started out at the same (8<sup>th</sup>–9<sup>th</sup>) grade level in junior high school. This first set of predictors explains about 16 per cent of the variance in years of education completed ( $R^2 = .159$ ).

The second model adds into the equation a set of family context factors measured in 1992. Parental SES (a standardized composite measure of father's and mother's education, occupation, and homeownership) now has the strongest effect ( $t = 8.79$ ), and having grown up in an intact family also shows a positive and significant effect on children's attainment by age 24. Having one U.S.-born parent, however, shows a significant *negative* association — a finding that has been observed in earlier studies, linking U.S. nativity and greater acculturation with an eroding work ethic and deteriorating educational outcomes (Kao and Tienda 1995; Rumbaut 2000, 2004) — as does the number of siblings at home (*cf.* Downey 1995; Ream 2004). With these family factors entered the effect of Filipino ethnicity washes out (the coefficient turns negative and insignificant), suggesting that any Filipino advantage was accounted for by their socio-

economic status and family factors. The model adds another 6 per cent to the explained variance ( $R^2 = .224$ ).

The third model enters into the equation three measures of early expectations and effort. High educational expectations (a subjective index of how far they 'realistically' expected to get in their education, measured a decade earlier in 1992 in junior high school and again in 1995 in senior high school) have an extraordinarily strong effect on actual educational achievement in 2001–03; the *t* statistic indicates that the regression coefficient is over 14 times larger than its standard error, reflecting the strongest effect among all the predictors in the model, followed now by parental SES. All other predictor variables remain significant, including the two opposite measures of early discipline and work habits (daily hours of homework and of excessive television watching in junior and senior high), which have positive and negative independent effects respectively, net of all other factors, and continue to drive subsequent educational attainment even years later. These three additional predictors contribute another 13 per cent towards the explained variance in attainment ( $R^2 = .354$ ).

The fourth model enters a set of early school achievement predictors, all of which are shown to have significant net effects on the outcome variable, as expected; of them, the strongest effect is observed for academic GPA earned in high school ( $t = 9.77$ ), now closely followed by early expectations ( $t = 9.53$ ), whose effect is only moderately attenuated by the new set of determinants. Also showing strong positive effects on post-secondary educational attainment are early math and reading test scores, and the composite index of English fluency (a measure of speaking, reading and writing proficiency). Once these early achievement indicators are accounted for, gender (female), Mexican ethnicity, and early homework hours fade into insignificance, suggesting that their effects are absorbed by the variables now in the equation. (Indeed, homework hours had been one of the strongest predictors of GPA in high school.) All other predictors retain significant effects — note that the negative effect of having one U.S.-born parent is actually strengthened — and the  $R^2$  increases to .440.

Finally, the two 'turning point' variables (having been incarcerated, number of children) are entered into the equation to examine their association with the number of years of education completed, net of all other factors already entered. Both have significant negative coefficients, as shown in the last column of Table 9, confirming their association with downward mobility in early adulthood — with the relationship between early parenting and post-secondary educational attainment appearing as particularly deleterious — although, as noted, we cannot here disentangle the causal order of these latter

associations with our current data. While all other variables in the model retain statistical significance, the predictive strength of some is now attenuated, especially of school suspensions and an intact family structure, which (as will be shown below) are among the principal positive and negative predictors of incarceration and early child-bearing.

A Cambodian and Vietnamese ethnicity retain negative and positive significant effects on attainment, suggesting that, compared to all other groups in this sample, there are characteristics about these two refugee groups not measured in this model that shape their divergent educational trajectories (for a comparative analysis see Rumbaut and Ima 1988). The finding also raises questions about the meaning of a presumably homogeneous Asian pan-ethnicity. If, as documented again in this article, Asian-origin groups are found among the top and the bottom of virtually every adaptation outcome we have examined — even Southeast Asian-origin groups sharing a common refugee status — to what then does the ideology of the ‘model minority’ refer? That question is explored more systematically in the article by Zhou in this Issue.

What predicts the likelihood of having been incarcerated and of having had children in early adulthood in the first place? Table 10 presents the results of two logistic regressions examining that question. In the first equation (predicting the odds of incarceration), the strongest determinant, as expected, is gender: incarceration for a crime is an overwhelmingly male phenomenon (in the model shown, the odds are over 4 times higher for males). That is followed in predictive strength (as indicated by the Wald statistic) by a set of critical school events, of which the most significant is the number of times the youths had been suspended from school between 8<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades — suspensions emerge here as a strong flag of future problems in the transition to adulthood — and then by ‘inactive’ school status (indicative of additional transiency or instability), by experiences of having been physically threatened in high school more than twice (much more prevalent in lower-SES inner-city schools with significant gang activity), and of having been offered illegal drugs in school more than twice (which in CILS was more prevalent in higher-SES suburban public schools where the students who reported involvement with buying or selling drugs came from more affluent homes and were more likely to have the money to spend on drugs). Perhaps suggesting the extension of those involvements in the latter case is the weak but positive association between incarceration and parental SES. Interestingly, our measure of the daily number of hours spent doing homework during those school years in 1992 and 1995 has a moderate but significant negative effect on the likelihood of being jailed for a criminal offence, as do (more weakly) early educational expectations

**Table 10.** *Determinants of Incarceration and of Having a Child in Early Adulthood: Children of Immigrants, 2001–03*

Predictors	Time Measured	Was incarcerated				Had a child			
		<i>B</i>	Wald <sup>a</sup>	Sig.	Odds	<i>B</i>	Wald <sup>a</sup>	Sig.	Odds
<i>Sex, Age, Ethnicity:</i>									
Male		1.423	17.75	***	4.15	−1.082	47.52	***	0.34
Age (years)		0.007	0.00	NS	1.01	0.246	10.90	***	1.28
Mexican		0.398	0.95	NS	1.49	0.872	17.85	***	2.39
Filipino		−0.360	0.68	NS	0.70	0.877	13.87	***	2.40
Vietnamese		0.726	2.27	NS	2.07	−0.306	0.91	NS	0.74
<i>Family Context:</i>									
Parental SES <sup>b</sup>	1992	0.436	3.80	*	1.55	−0.324	7.05	**	0.72
Both parents at home	1992	−0.378	2.64	†	0.68	−0.505	10.76	***	0.60
One US-born parent	1992	0.236	0.47	NS	1.27	0.399	4.36	*	1.49
<i>Expectations, Effort:</i>									
Educational expectations	1992–95	−0.253	2.71	†	0.78	−0.348	16.09	***	0.71
Daily homework hours	1992–95	−0.287	4.30	*	0.75	−0.009	0.02	NS	0.99
<i>Early Achievement:</i>									
Achievement test scores	1991	−0.135	1.38	NS	0.87	−0.180	9.08	**	0.84
Academic GPA	1991–95	−0.210	1.50	NS	0.81	−0.278	7.88	**	0.76
English proficiency index	1992–95	0.381	1.04	NS	1.46	−0.357	4.20	*	0.70
<i>Critical School Events:</i>									
School suspensions	1991–95	0.338	11.57	***	1.40	0.315	13.96	***	1.37
School inactive status	1993–95	0.941	8.64	***	2.56	0.916	21.79	***	2.50



**Table 10** (*Continued*)

Predictors	Time Measured	Was incarcerated				Had a child			
		<i>B</i>	Wald <sup>a</sup>	Sig.	Odds	<i>B</i>	Wald <sup>a</sup>	Sig.	Odds
Physically threatened <sup>c</sup>	1993–95	1.356	9.79	***	3.88	NE			
Offered drugs <sup>c</sup>	1993–95	0.710	5.01	*	2.03	NE			
Constant		–3.180	0.72	NS		–3.298	2.73	†	
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup> =			0.300				0.300		
N = 1,475									

**Source:** Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), Wave III Survey, San Diego Sample, 2001–03.

Significance: \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , † $p < .10$ , NS = not significant. NE = variable not entered in equation.

<sup>a</sup>Measure of strength of association (square of the logistic regression coefficient divided by its standard error).

<sup>b</sup>Standardized composite measure of father's and mother's education, occupation, and homeownership.

<sup>c</sup>A dummy variable, where 1 = event happened more than twice in high school.

and an intact family context. Homework hours and high expectations were among the strongest predictors of final GPAs in high school, reflecting a measure of discipline and ambition that carries over into achievement even many years later (as seen in Table 9). More important, none of our dummy variables for ethnicity exhibited a significant association with the dependent variable, despite the fact that Mexicans had by far the highest rates of arrest and incarceration, suggesting that the variables which remain in the equation (such as suspensions, inactivity and critical school events) ‘explain’ the Mexican association.

The right-hand columns in Table 10 examine the effect of the same set of determinants on the likelihood of early childbearing. Again gender shows the strongest effect (the Wald statistic of 48 dwarfs all others): women are much more likely to become parents in early adulthood than men. But quite unlike the equation predicting incarceration, two dummy variables serving as proxies for national origins here emerge as strong predictors: with all other factors controlled for, Mexicans and Filipinos emerge as being more likely than other groups to have children early. The Mexicans and Filipinos are also the two groups who are overwhelmingly more likely to be Roman Catholics and to report more frequent attendance at church services. But in a separate analysis inserting Catholic religion and frequency of religious participation, those predictors had no effect on childbearing outcomes. It was the Mexican and Filipino ethnicities, not religious beliefs or behaviours, which remained significant regardless. Lower parental SES, and having grown up in a home without both natural parents present, significantly increased the odds of early childbearing, as did lower achievement test scores and lower GPAs in secondary school, along with a history of school suspensions and district transfers (inactivity) — indeed, teen pregnancy while in school may have precipitated school leaving and the inactive status. In addition, two other predictors make a significant difference: the lower the educational expectations held in junior and senior high school, and the lower the index of English fluency, the more likely it was that the respondent would have children. Indeed, the effect of early ambition in strongly diminishing the likelihood of early parenting is particularly strong — as it was in predicting future educational attainment — and underscores the importance and resilience of that subjective factor in shaping objective mobility outcomes. In a follow-up article (see Feliciano and Rumbaut in this Issue), we ask what happens to the dreams of the new second generation as they become young adults, and seek to answer that question systematically.

## Conclusion

How the story of the present era of immigration to the United States is told will hinge on the manner and degree to which the immigrants' children are incorporated in the American economy and society. But that story, as it is now unfolding, is not reducible to a simple or single unilinear master trend. In this article we have examined differences by ethnicity, gender and generation in three key variables shaping socio-economic trajectories in early adulthood: education, incarceration, and early childbearing. On the one hand, national-level data on the educational attainment of Latin American and Asian-origin young adults show significant upward mobility overall from the foreign-born (1.5) to the U.S.-born (second) generation. But there is a wide range in attainment by national origin, with Asian ethnics generally achieving much more than the most sizable Latin American groups; and by gender, with females outperforming males. Those differences underscore a sharp segmentation in their socio-economic trajectories to date. Moreover, both the national-level data and the CILS data show strong associations between low levels of education and high rates of incarceration (among men) and early childbearing (among women), and by implication with diminished occupational and economic success, in a spiral of cumulating disadvantage and downward mobility. Indeed, the new era of mass immigration has coincided with an era of mass imprisonment in the United States, which has further transformed paths to adulthood among young men with little education.

While the data show a *decrease* in early and overall childbearing among U.S.-born young women compared to their foreign-born co-ethnics, they also show an *increase* in rates of incarceration among young men from the foreign-born to the U.S.-born generations, and over time in the U.S. among the foreign-born. Paradoxically, incarceration rates are lowest among immigrant young men, even among the least educated among them, but they increase sharply by the second generation, especially among the least educated — evidence of downward assimilation that parallels the patterns of the native-born, and in particular of native minorities. The proportions involved may be relatively small, but they still comprise significant minorities; nationally in 2000, for example, about 15 per cent of young men 25 to 39 had failed to graduate from high school (including 31 per cent of the foreign-born who came as children), and among them about 2 per cent of the foreign-born and 10 per cent of the U.S.-born were in prison.

Given the limitations of cross-sectional national data, we turned to the longitudinal CILS data set to probe the determinants and dynamics of these outcomes (educational attainment, incarceration,

childbearing). To be sure, with half the young adults in the CILS sample still living in their parents' home and attending school at age 24, the results summarized in this analysis must be considered preliminary: like the respondents themselves, this is still a work in progress. Still, the portrait sketched here of the educational trajectories and transitions to early adulthood among a significant new component of the American population neither endorses the pessimism of predictions about a rapid expansion of a 'multiethnic rainbow underclass' — let alone 'the end of the America we have known for more than three centuries' (Huntington 2004) — nor does it paint a rosy view of an intergenerational straight-line ascent into the mainstream. The patterns we have seen — even among today's young Mexican-origin second generation (a population that has had its share of previous second generations), which because of its size and characteristics is of primary concern — are too multidirectional and multidimensional, and shaped by too many contingencies, to render tenable any simple views of a single smooth transition, or of a one-way ride to perdition. Nonetheless, the results are clearly patterned, interrelated and cumulative, and suggest that much of the determination of educational, occupational and social trajectories in early adulthood can be traced to specifiable characteristics, processes, events and contexts observable and measurable in early to mid adolescence. Sorting and spelling out the paths and mechanisms that lead to virtuous instead of vicious spirals of cumulative advantage instead of disadvantage, and testing competing hypotheses about the incorporation and mobility of these extraordinarily diverse populations whose local story is bound to shape the national narrative in consequential ways, can fill anew the research agenda for the study of intergenerational mobility in this new era of mass migration.

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